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It is risky to let Ukraine into the EU. It’s more dangerous to keep it out.
Dit artikel komt uit The Economist
Do European leaders think their countries might soon be at war? Their words say yes. In Cyprus for a European Union summit on April 23rd and 24th, Poland’s prime minister, Donald Tusk, voiced fears that Russia could attack Europe’s eastern flank within „months”. Given doubts about America’s commitment to its transatlantic allies, Europe must get serious and strengthen its common defences within NATO and the EU, he declared.
The actions of other European leaders are more ambivalent. The contradictions are especially glaring when it comes to their relations with Ukraine. EU governments this month approved a €90bn ($105bn) loan for Ukraine that had been blocked by a spoiler in their midst: the populist-right, Putin-friendly government of Viktor Orban in Hungary. Unfortunately for Ukraine, Mr Orban’s ejection by voters in mid-April has made other leaders’ doubts more visible, now they can no longer hide behind Hungary’s veto. Many EU member countries, including the power-duo of France and Germany, are in no hurry to grant Ukraine the full membership that it seeks, let alone on the accelerated timeline demanded by the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, who wants his country to join by January 2027. Friedrich Merz, the German chancellor, has publicly ruled out swift accession, stating that Ukraine cannot join the bloc while at war and must meet strict standards on the rule of law, corruption and other fundamental principles.
De redactie van NRC selecteert de beste artikelen uit The Economist voor een breder perspectief op internationale politiek en economie.
Some concerns are understandable. For all its heroism, Ukraine is a corrupt, fragile democracy that is liable to emerge from this conflict with ambiguous borders and Russia as its neighbour-from-hell. Other Euro-worries are more feeble. For instance, EU farmers are scared of competition from Ukraine’s large, world-class farming industry. If the country ever does join, it is said in Brussels, the Common Agricultural Policy could not survive in its current, subsidy-heavy form.
Against such doubts Ukraine’s backers make a stark counter-argument. Any credible defence of Europe must involve Ukraine’s 800,000 men at arms, and its home-grown, AI-guided drone and counter-drone technologies that have turned front lines into buzzing, futuristic death-zones for Russian invaders. The tide has turned, was the response of President Alexander Stubb of Finland, when asked recently about security guarantees for Ukraine. „We Europeans have to understand we need Ukraine more than Ukraine needs us,” he counselled.
Ukraine long pinned its hopes on NATO membership, and on mutual-defence pledges in Article 5 of that alliance’s treaty. Alas for Ukraine, its NATO ambitions are „dead” for the foreseeable future, say Western officials. As president, Joe Biden was sceptical about the country joining NATO. Its hopes were killed by President Donald Trump’s hostility to the idea and indeed to Ukraine.
That leaves EU accession as the remaining way for Ukraine to anchor itself in Europe and the wider democratic world. With a full welcome years away, France and Germany are pushing associate forms of membership for Ukraine, possibly involving observers’ seats in EU institutions and councils, without voting rights. Perhaps most important, there is talk of extending to Ukraine the bloc’s own mutual-defence clause, buried in Article 42.7 of the EU treaties, as part of a provisional set-up.
The Cyprus summit saw EU officials given the task of exploring how Article 42.7 might work in a conflict. According to Germany’s chancellor, the assembled leaders also broadly endorsed the notion of provisional membership for Ukraine, understanding that Europe cannot safely close its door to that country. Ukrainian voters may one day have to endorse a peace treaty that involves giving up territory, Mr Merz went on. To win such a referendum, Mr Zelensky would need to be given a pathway that ultimately leads to „full membership of the European Union”.
At this point, European and Ukrainian citizens can be forgiven some confusion about the signals sent by Euro-grandees. On the one hand, leaders are frightened about Ukraine breaking today’s systems of EU farm subsidies. On the other, they seem happy to extend solemn defence and security pledges to Ukraine: a far more significant commitment.
The key to the puzzle lies in views of war and its imminence. If Europe really does face an attack by Russia, nothing matters more than locking Ukraine in as a partner. Indeed, in off-the-record conversations with senior European and Ukrainian sources, the strongest arguments made for Ukrainian membership are all about security threats. In addition to bullish talk about accessing Ukrainian defence technologies, some arguments are distinctly bleak. When the war with Russia ends, it is noted, Ukraine will be home to hundreds of thousands of battle-hardened veterans. If spurned by the EU, there is no guarantee that powerful factions in Ukraine will not turn away from the West. Ukraine drifting into civil conflicts and fights over resources, or growing closer to Russia, are all cited as dangers.
Henry Kissinger saw this moment coming. Interviewed by The Economistin 2023, America’s former secretary of state said that Ukraine should join NATO, reversing his earlier views. Europe is saying something „madly dangerous”, he worried. It is calling Ukraine too risky to be in NATO while arming „the hell out of them”.
Alas, talk of dangers and risks repels those European leaders and voters who do not see war with Russia as inevitable. If appeasing Mr Putin is a temptation, then every argument about Ukraine’s political instability, or its anger if kept outside the EU, is a reason to keep it out of the club. Europe has every right to ask whether Ukraine is ready for EU membership. Ukraine’s fate may hinge on something simpler: whether Europeans are ready to fight.
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