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Some are convinced that talking is futile.
Dit artikel komt uit The Economist
Iran's Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf meets Pakistan's Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir in Tehran, Iran.
According to leaks from the White House, America is, once again, the closest it has been yet to a deal to end its war with Iran. Donald Trump spoke of 24 hours of „very good talks”. Iran said America’s proposal was „being considered”. But for Iran’s leaders, actions speak louder than words. In the Gulf America attacked an Iranian tanker trying to break its blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. Israel struck Beirut. And Iran unveiled a new „Persian Gulf Strait Authority”, demanding payment in its currency, the rial, for safe passage. Even more than its nuclear programme, Iran’s claims on the strait threaten any deal and risk reigniting the fighting.
Huddled in their bunkers, Iran’s leaders are preparing as much for escalation as diplomacy. The clerics’ former checks on the generals of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (irgc) vanished when Israel killed the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, on the first day of war. His son and successor, Mojtaba, is conspicuously absent. Formal authority rests with a 12-member National Security Council (NSC) which includes a posse of generals. In reality, the generals—all veterans of Iran’s eight-year war with Iraq—dominate. „It’s a soft revolution,” says an Iran-watcher.
De redactie van NRC selecteert de beste artikelen uit The Economist voor een breder perspectief op internationale politiek en economie.
Immediately after the ceasefire, pragmatists seemed to be ascendant. The most prominent, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf (pictured), a former irgc commander who is now speaker of parliament, flew to Islamabad as chief negotiator. He typifies a generation of veterans who have entrenched themselves in Iran’s conglomerates, hobnob with oligarchs and have a stake in preserving Iran’s industrial base. As Tehran’s mayor, he did more property deals than Mr Trump, boasts an Iranian businessman. It earned him a reputation for money-seeking and corruption.
Mr Qalibaf remains sympathetic to the pleas of businessmen who counsel against escalation. Bombardment has crippled pharmaceutical, steel and petrochemical plants and stripped many workers of their jobs. The naval blockade is compounding the damage. The rial has more than halved in value since last summer’s war. With stockpiles dwindling, the price of essentials has soared. Economists expect inflation in goods to hit services, too.
Mr Qalibaf would prefer to steer around the blockade while preserving the ceasefire. His ties to both the irgc and commerce give him access to smuggling rings on the border. Formal overland trade has surged since the Gulf closed. Iraq and Turkey—already key trading partners—have become more vital still. Commerce with China, Iran’s biggest market, is being rerouted by land. Pakistan has opened six new crossings; traders speak of Gwadar, in Pakistan, as an alternative to Jebel Ali, a vast port in the United Arab Emirates (uae). Iran is trying to send some oil to China by rail. Small boats zip across the Caspian Sea, bound for ports in Russia and Turkmenistan. Build two walls from New York to Los Angeles, suggested Mr Qalibaf on social media recently, and their length would still fall about 1,000km short of Iran’s total frontiers: „Good luck blockading a country with those borders.”
Yet he faces stiff opposition. „There’s a power struggle within the irgc,” says another Iran-watcher. The speaker’s most fearsome opponent is Ahmad Vahidi. A career soldier, former defence minister and the current head of the IRGC, he represents the hardliners. „He’s an end-of-days man,” says a former Israeli intelligence officer who worked on Iran, a reference to the Shia millenarianism that some reckon guides him. Mr Vahidi believes America will only tighten the noose. Iran should resist while it can. The current economic hardship, he argues, could spark renewed unrest of the sort seen in January. „They’re not sure they can survive another round of protests,” says a manufacturer. War, by contrast, would keep people indoors—and could rally some behind the regime.
If the hawks prevail, escalation will follow. Local commanders would revert to the tactics adopted at the war’s outset, reinstating a prepared list of targets. Strikes on tankers could resume, keeping Hormuz closed. They might also do the same in the Red Sea. American warships and Gulf cities could come under more fire.
Iran’s bitterest local foe seems to be the uae, which now hosts Israeli hardware and personnel. But Qatar remains a potential target, driven by grievance over its gas extraction from South Pars, a field it shares with Iran. „People are underestimating the power of Iran in the region,” says Reza Bundy, an Iranian-American asset-risk manager. „They’ve barely begun to roll out the escalatory system they have prepared for the last 40 years.”
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